Skip to content
Chapter 7 · Decisions 7-21

Full access is literally full

full_access is the explicit danger mode: the GUI gates it behind a guarded confirmation and the CLI behind --confirm-full-access. It already delegates arbitrary terminal execution to the current Windows user. Keeping one structured-file carve-out — the catalog-protected set (harness key/database files, runtime descriptors, and user-added RU_PROTECTED_PATHS entries) — made the preset stop short of its stated contract and forced the evaluator, every file adapter, and the root selector to carry a second, preset-dependent path classification.

Decision

The structured protected-path denial belongs to plan and standard only. full_access evaluates catalog-protected paths like any other target.

  • AgentPolicyProfileCatalog records StructuredProtectedPath as Allow for full_access, with AgentPolicyProfileCatalog.OpensProtectedPaths(profile) as the preset source of truth. plan and standard keep Deny, and hard-invalid requests stay denied in every preset.
  • PolicySnapshotEvaluator applies the protected-path pre-rule only for presets that do not open protected paths, so full_access falls through to the skip-all profile fallback.
  • CanonicalPathResolver carries an allowProtectedPaths flag that classifies catalog matches as ordinary inside/outside targets. ToolExecutionService builds the full-access tool set and its external call roots with the flag, and the file adapters receive the resolver instead of re-checking names; the cached tool-set key is scoped to the flag. Without the flag the resolver stays fail-closed, so compatibility paths (the desktop FileTools helpers and the v1 root tool sets) keep denying.
  • The terminal classifier is unchanged: it never enforced protected paths for full_access, which already treated a protected cwd as an ordinary launch directory.

Consequences

  • full_access can read and write the harness database, the harness key, and runtime descriptors. A compromised or prompt-injected model can therefore self-escalate — mint trust or approval records, persist rules, or delete audit rows — with no undo. That is the accepted meaning of the explicit danger mode; the protected-path guard was never a secret boundary against a hostile model.
  • Users who want the guard choose standard, where the critical work happens under asks and approvals. No GUI or CLI copy implies full_access keeps any protected-path denial.
  • The prompt projection, the contract documents, and the current-documentation guard are updated to the plan/standard-only spelling. Behavior coverage pins the flagged resolver, the preset-aware evaluator, and the opened adapter tool sets.

Amends: ADR-0011 (the full_access structured protected-path matrix cell and the corresponding hard-invariant bullet), and the "protected paths stay denied in every preset" statements in ADR-0014 and ADR-0018.