Full access is literally full¶
full_access is the explicit danger mode: the GUI gates it behind a guarded
confirmation and the CLI behind --confirm-full-access. It already delegates
arbitrary terminal execution to the current Windows user. Keeping one
structured-file carve-out — the catalog-protected set (harness key/database
files, runtime descriptors, and user-added RU_PROTECTED_PATHS entries) — made
the preset stop short of its stated contract and forced the evaluator, every
file adapter, and the root selector to carry a second, preset-dependent path
classification.
Decision¶
The structured protected-path denial belongs to plan and standard only.
full_access evaluates catalog-protected paths like any other target.
AgentPolicyProfileCatalogrecordsStructuredProtectedPathasAllowforfull_access, withAgentPolicyProfileCatalog.OpensProtectedPaths(profile)as the preset source of truth.planandstandardkeepDeny, and hard-invalid requests stay denied in every preset.PolicySnapshotEvaluatorapplies the protected-path pre-rule only for presets that do not open protected paths, sofull_accessfalls through to the skip-all profile fallback.CanonicalPathResolvercarries anallowProtectedPathsflag that classifies catalog matches as ordinary inside/outside targets.ToolExecutionServicebuilds the full-access tool set and its external call roots with the flag, and the file adapters receive the resolver instead of re-checking names; the cached tool-set key is scoped to the flag. Without the flag the resolver stays fail-closed, so compatibility paths (the desktopFileToolshelpers and the v1 root tool sets) keep denying.- The terminal classifier is unchanged: it never enforced protected paths for
full_access, which already treated a protected cwd as an ordinary launch directory.
Consequences¶
full_accesscan read and write the harness database, the harness key, and runtime descriptors. A compromised or prompt-injected model can therefore self-escalate — mint trust or approval records, persist rules, or delete audit rows — with no undo. That is the accepted meaning of the explicit danger mode; the protected-path guard was never a secret boundary against a hostile model.- Users who want the guard choose
standard, where the critical work happens under asks and approvals. No GUI or CLI copy impliesfull_accesskeeps any protected-path denial. - The prompt projection, the contract documents, and the
current-documentation guard are updated to the
plan/standard-only spelling. Behavior coverage pins the flagged resolver, the preset-aware evaluator, and the opened adapter tool sets.
Amends: ADR-0011 (the
full_accessstructured protected-path matrix cell and the corresponding hard-invariant bullet), and the "protected paths stay denied in every preset" statements in ADR-0014 and ADR-0018.