Retire OS confinement for terminal children¶
Context¶
ADR-0014 moved tool execution into the Host and added a Windows AppContainer
around standard terminal and managed-Git children. The product owner has
explicitly retired that OS isolation requirement and chosen coding reliability
as the priority. Keeping AppContainer policy, ACL grants, network capability
management and a sandbox escape parameter adds platform-specific complexity to
the command launch path.
Decision¶
Terminal and managed-Git child processes launch as the current Windows user in
both standard and full_access. There is no OS-level filesystem or network
confinement for those children. plan continues to deny terminal execution.
standard retains its existing command classifier and approval policy;
full_access retains its existing arbitrary-terminal policy. The bash tool
schema removes the sandbox property and rejects obsolete arguments.
The in-process execution authority from ADR-0014 remains in force. Structured file tools keep their canonical path and protected-path checks. Terminal approval decisions remain policy controls and do not imply OS confinement. Job Object process-tree lifetime, timeout, cancellation, output bounds and redaction remain enforced. Provider API keys continue to use existing credential storage. Secret values stripped from a launched child environment are included as redaction seeds so known secret values are redacted from terminal receipts and streaming output. This is output redaction, not a boundary against an arbitrary current-user command that can read files or use the network.
The Public Contract remains the 42 HTTP routes, with no WebSocket route.
Consequences¶
- Standard commands may access files and network resources available to the current Windows user, subject to the existing classifier and approvals.
- Windows AppContainer profile creation, ACL grants, capability management and sandbox-specific approval reasons are retired.
- Terminal error handling must not imply that an approval creates an OS boundary. Structured-file path protections remain independent.
- Historical verification records and ADR-0014 retain evidence of the former implementation; current behavior is defined here and in the operations docs.